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STATE REGULATION OF DRUGS: WHO MAY SELL
"PATENT AND PROPRIETARY" MEDICINES
A NETWORK of federal and state law guards public health by regulating the
retail sale of drugs. All toxic, habit-forming, or otherwise dangerous drugs
may be sold only on the prescription of a licensed practitioner.' Under state
pharmacy laws, such prescriptions may be filled-and such drugs sold--only
by a trained pharmacist, examined and licensed by the state.2 Similarly, drugs
which are normally harmless but require compounding by the retailer are
salable only by pharmacists. 3 As a result, the pharmaceutical profession clearly
has the exclusive right to sell all drugs, except those which are not harmful
and which are sold in the manufacturer's original package without further
compounding.
1. Under the Federal Food. Drug and Cosmetic Act, as amended, habit-forming drugs
and other drugs unsafe for use without professional supervision because of their toxicity
or method of use may be sold only on prescription or authorization for refill and must bear
the legend: "Caution: Federal law prohibits dispensing without prescription." If these
requirements are not met the drug is deemed misbranded. 65 STAT. 648 (1951), 21 U.S.C.
§ 353(b) (Supp. 1952). Misbranded drugs are subject to seizure, and the seller to injunc-
tive and criminal proceedings. 52 STAT. 1043 (1938), 21 U.S.C. §§ 332-4 (1946), as amended,
62 STAT. 582 (1948), 21 U.S.C. § 334(a) (Supp. 1952). These provisions apply to drugs
from the time they enter interstate commerce until they are purchased at retail by the
ultimate consumer. United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689, 696-7 (1948). Drugs which do
not enter interstate commerce are governed by state food and drug laws, which are patterned
after the present federal act or the earlier act of 1906. See Herrick, Drug Regudations in
DRUG RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 360 (Smith & Herrick ed. 1948).
Habit-forming drugs are also restricted to prescription sale by the Harrison Narcotics
Act, 38 STAT. 786 (1914), as amended, 26 U.S.C. § 2 554(c) (2) (1946), and in 43 states by
the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act, 9A UNIFoRm LAWs AN or. §§ 2, 6 (1951). Medicinal
preparations containing harmless quantities of certain narcotics may be sold without pre-
scription. 38 STAT. 789 (1914), as amended, 26 U.S.C. § 2551(a) (1946); 9A UNiFoRmt
LAWS ANNOT. § 8 (Supp. 1952).
Poisons for non-medicinal purposes may be sold at retail without prescription by regis-
tered pharmacists if they are labeled with a warning and an antidote prescription, and if a
register of all sales is maintained. See, e.g., 1 ME. Ri,. STAT. c. 62, § 15 (1944) ; N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 45:14-19, 45:14-20, 45:14-22 (1940) ; CAL. HEALTH & SAFMY Coos §§ 20751, 2075Z,
20755,20757 (Deering, 1952).
2. Laws in every state create a state Board of Pharmacy authorized to examine phar-
maceutical college graduates and register them to practice pharmacy. It is unlawful for
anyone other than a registered pharmacist to fill or compound the prescription of a medical
practitioner. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:14-1, 45:14-6, 45:14-7, 45:14-13 (1940) ; 2C
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-55, 90-61, 90-72 (1950); 11 MiNN. STAT. ANN. §§ 151.02, 151.06,
151.10, 151.15 (1946).
3. The statutes do not distinguish between the compounding of dangerous drugs and
of relatively innocuous ones. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:14-13 (1940). This policy is
unquestionably sound. Correct compounding requires skill. And the consequences of error
may be disastrous, however safe the intended end product would be.
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It is unsettled, however, whether the pharmacist's monopoly also includes
the right to sell this residuary class of pre-packaged, non-prescription drugs.
4
In general language, the pharmacy laws confine "drugs and medicines" to the
drug store.-' But in every state except three, the statute contains a specific
exemption, which permits non-pharmacist merchants to sell "patent and pro-
prietary" medicines. 7 This exemption has received two divergent construc-
tions. The technical interpretation, followed in seven states. s defines "patent
4. The class of non-prescription (and therefore "not harmful"). pre-packaged, com-
pletely compounded medicines is imprecisely referrcd to as "over-the-counter items" or "self-
medicaments" y the literature of the drug trade.
5. See, e.g., 11 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 151.15 (1946) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. §45:14-6 (1940)
2C N.C. GF.N. -STAT. § 90-71 (1950). The pharmacy acts which define "drugs" do so in the
sweeping terms of the Federal Food, Drug a:id Cosmetic Act. 52 STAT. 1040 (1938), 21
U.S.C. § 321(g) (1946). Such a definition embraces all articles recognized in the official
pharniceutical compendia, all other articles intended for the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, or
prevention of disease, and all articles, other than food, intellded to affect the strudure or
function of the body. See, c.g.. 21 LA. REv. STAT. § 37-1171(3) (1951); 1-A OHIo GErN.
COnE ANN. § 1296-1(2) (Page, 1946): WIs. STAT. § 151.06 (1951).
6..KAN. GEN,. STAT. c. 65, art. 16 (1949) ; NEv. Co.\ip. LAws §8 5040-62a (Supp. 1949)
4 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 51-901 (1941).
These laws are not entirely devoid of exceptions. The New Mexico statute allows sale
of patent and proprietary medicines by non-pharmacists in towns, villages, and camps in
which no registered pharmacist resides. 5 N.M. STAT. ANN. §71-623 (1941.). And a Kansas
court in effect created an exception by holding that hydrogen peroxide was not a "medicine"
and therefore not encompassed by the pharmacy act, even though there was no statutory
exemption. State v. Hanchette, 88 KAN. 864, 129 Pac. 1184 (1913). In addition, the Kansas
law now exempts "the usual domestic remedies and medicines." KAN. GEN. STAT. § 65-1611
(1949)1.
An. exemption for "domestic" or "household remedies" often appears in statutes which
also exempt patent and proprietary medicines. See. e.g., GA. COmE ANN. § 84-1317 (Supp.
1.951) : ILL. REV. STAT. c. 9, § 36 (1951) ; 2C N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-71 (1949). This seldom
considered exemption has been construed to except only those medicines which come into
such general use that their effects are understood by people without medical knowledge. 21
LA. REv. STAT. §37-1204 (1950) ; See Lewis v.,Brannen, 6 Ga. App. 419, 422-3, 65 S.E. 189,
190-1 (1909).
7. Only a few of the statutes,embody an adequate definition of "patent and proprietary."
See notes 8, 14 infra.
8. The language of the Indiana and New Hampshire acts compels the technical defini-
tion. 11-1 IND. STAT. § 63-1.114 (Burns, 1951) ("medicines of secret composition.
2 N.H. REv. LAws c. 256, § I (XI) (1942) ("certain individuals'have the exclusive right to
manufacture. ).
Iowa, Mimesota, Oregon, Wisconsin, and probably New York have adopted the technical
view by judicial decision. State v. Jewett-Market Co., 209 Iowa 567, 228 N.W. 288 (1929);
Minnesota v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 184 Minn. 51, 237 N.W. 817 (1931); State v. Combs,
169 Ore. 566, 130 P.2d 947 (1942) (harmless- compendia articles may be sold by non-phar-
macists who obtain permit from Board); State v. Wakeen, 263 Wis. 401, 57 N;W.2d 364
(1953); cf. Board of Pharmacy v. Matthews, 197 N.Y. 353, 90 N.E. 966 (1910).
The statute. construed in the .latthews case, supra, contained no exemption. But the
holding that the state can restrict to the pharmacy such harmless household remedies as spirit
of camphor would seem to support a technical interpretation of the patent and ,proprietary
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and proprietary medicines" as those protected by letters patent or produced
exclusively by the owner of a secret forniula or process.9 It does not exempt
preparations listed in the United States Pharmacopoeia (U.S.P.) or other
compendia." because formulae found therein are said to be neither patented
nor secret." Applying this standard, one court recently held that aspirin, mill<
of magnesia, and camphorated oil are not proprietary medicines.' 2 Such a nar-
row construction gives pharmacists the exclusive right to sell all but a small
exemption which was added to the statute after this decision. Board of Pharmacy v. Mat-
thews, supra at 359, 90 N.E. at 968. No New York case has directly challenged the implica-
tion of Jlatthe-s. But dictum in a later case involving the display of the words "Patent
Medicines" by a non-pharmacist indicates that New York might now take a broader view.
People v. Bernstein, 237 App. Div. 270, 273, 261 N.Y. Supp. 381, 384 (2d Dep't 1932).
9. See Jewett. Woohorth, Coml,.s, and lf'akeen cases, supra note 8. A proprietary
interest in manufacture of the preparation is the essence of the technical interpretation. This
Ownership may be found either in a patent or in the secrecy of the formula or process of
manufacture. The courts do not discuss the problem, but presumably a licensing agreement
by which the "owner" permitted others to manufacture his medicine would not destroy its
proprietary nature. Under the technical view aspirin was considered proprietary so long as
its German discoverer was able to shroud his process. See State v. Jewett Market Co., 209
Iowa 567, 570-1, 228 N.W. 288, 289 (1929). However, once the patent expires or the secret
is discovered and competitors begin to manufacture the preparation, it ceases to be proprie-
tary and is salable only by pharmacists. Ibid. See 15 IOWA L. REV. 369 (1.930).
10. The United States Pharmacopoeia (U.S.P.) is published periodically by the United
States Pharmacopoeial Convention whose membership is composed of federal agencies, na-
tional medical and pharmaceutical associations, and schools of medicine and pharmacy. Timi
UNITED STATES PHARMACO'OEIAL CONVENTIOX-AISTRACT OF PRoFDINGS 107-108 (Decen-
nial Meeting, 1950). Its object is to promulgate uniform standards for drugs and medicines
in current use and to establish tests fr their strength, quality, and purity. U.S.P. REvisrox
XIV, p. xxviii (1950). The National Formulary (N.F.) is published by the American
Pharmaceutical Association fir similar purposes. N.F., p. xxxv (8th ed. 1946). These
compendia and others (NEw AND NoN-OFIciAL REMEDIES, HOMEOPATHIC PHARMACOPOEIA
OF THE UNITED STATES) are recognized by state and federal food, drug, and cosmetic acts
both in defining '*drugs" and in establishing standards of purity. See, e.g., 52 STAT. 1041.
1049 (1938), 21 U.S.C. §§321(g), 351(b) (1946); 16 F.A. STAT. ANN. §§500.03(4),
500.14(2) (1943).
11. See, e.g., Minnesota v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 184 Minn. 51, 54, 237 N.W. 817-18
(1931) (milk of magnesia U.S.P. not proprietary); Culver v. Nelson, -Minn.--, 54
N.W.2d 7, 13 (1952) (vitamin preparations not proprietary). Before vitamins were recog-
Iized by U.S.P. they were considered food supplements, not medicines. Board of Pharmacy
v. Quackenbush, 22 N.J. Misc. 334,39 A.2d 28 (C.P. 1940).
The stated policy of both U.S.P. and N.F. is not to list patented or secret preparations.
U.S.P. REvisiox XIV, p. xxviii (1950) ; N.F., p. xxxv (8th ed. 1946). U.S.P. warns, how-
ever, that some of the formulae listed may be protected by a patent. U.S.P. REvIsioN XIV,
p. ii (1950). Obviously a formula listed in the compendia is no longer secret. But since
the method of manufacture is not listed, it would seem that those U.S.P. items which require
"know-how** on the part of the manufacture still fit the technical requirement of a secret
process. Furthermore, U.S.P. has emphasized that its primary objective is to supply the
medical profession with a list of medicines, not to aid in the enforcement of drug laws.
U.S.P. RiwisIoN XIV, p. xi (1950).
12. State v. Wakeen, 263 Wis. 401, 57 N.W.2d 364 (1953).
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class of pre-packaged, non-prescription medicines.' 3 In contrast, the seventeen
jurisdictions which employ the commnon usage interpretation 14 read "patent"
and "proprietary" as interchangeable descriptions of all harmless, pre-packaged
medicines properly labeled with directions for use.1  Adopting this view, a
court recently held that aspirin, milk of magnesia, and hydrogen peroxide are
proprietary.' 6 This construction permits non-pharmacist merchants to sell all
pre-packaged preparations deemed safe for use without prescription.17 In the
13. Patents are no longer granted for chemical formulae. See Fischelis, W',at is a
Patent or Proprietary Medicine? 46 Sc.xTimc MONTHLY 25 (1938). It is still possible to
patent a chemical process, but one court has said that patent and proprietary medicines in
the technical sense have become a "'rare class." See Wrigley's Stores v. Michigan Board of
Pharmacy, 336 Mich. 583, 59 N.W.2d S, 12 (1953).
14. Seven states have adopted the commmn usage definition by judicial interpretati-n.
People v. Heron, 34 Cal. App. 2d 755, 90 P.2d 154 (1939) (overruling previous enunciation
of the technical definition in People v. McClain. 2 Cal. AIPp. 2d 751, 33 P.2d 710 (1934)) ;
State v. Ridgeway Drug Co., 324 Ill. App. 585, 59 N.E.2d 351 (1945) (aspirin U.S.P. and
rochelle salts U.S.P. held proprietary) : Kentucky Board of Pharmacy v. Cassidy, 115 Ky.
690, 74 S.V. 730 (1903); Wrigley's Stores v. Michigan Btard of Pharmacy, 336 Mich.
583, 59 N.W.2d 8 (1953); State v. Stephens, 102 Mont. 414, 59 P2d 54 (1936) ; State v.
Geest, 118 Neb. 562, 225 N.W. 709 (1929) ; Proprietary Ass'n v. Board of Pharmacy,
27 N.J. Super. 204, 99 A.2d 52 (1953).
Ten states have acts which define "'patent and proprietary" in its broad, pl.pular sense.
These exemptions are of four types: (1) Origival package medicines sold to the general
public under a trade name or similar protective device and comp3 ing with the requirements
of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. Auz. Coi-E Ax-. § 67-1501(g) (Supp. 1952) ;
7 IDAHo CODE § 37-2205 (1948) ; 21 LA. REv. STAT. § 37-1204 (1950) ; 5 S.C. CoDE § 56-1316
(1952) ; 3 Wyo. ComP. STAT. § 37-1910(a) (Supp. 1953). (2) Original package medicines
protected by a trade device. 4 N.D. REV. CODE § 43-1502(4) (1943) (registered or copy-
righted) ; 7 VA. CODE § 54-399(11) (1950). (3) Original pack-age medicines in compliance
with the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. AL,. Con tit. 46, § 256 (1940) ; 4 Tr-:;:;.
CODE § 7002.1 (Williams, 1941) (if put up by a pharmacist). (4) All medicines except those
which must be sold on prescription. VT. STAT. § 6858 (1947).
In practice, all four definitions are the same. All non-prescription medicines which enter
interstate commerce must comply with the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. One
requirement is that the medicine be labeled with the preducer's name. 52 STaT. 1050 (193S),
21 U.S.C. § 352(b) (1940). Such a label would satisfy the demand for sale under a trade
name. The need for a trade name is the result of efforts by courts and legislatures adopting
the common usage definition to find some element of proprietorship in proprietary medicines.
It is estimated that all but five percent of the largest selling packaged medicines travel in
interstate commerce. Communication to the YALE. LAW JOURNA. from Dr. Frederick J.
Cullen, Vice-President of the Proprietary Association, dated November 25, 1953, in Yale
Law Library.
15. Adequate directions for use are required by the Federal Foud, Drug and Cosmetic
Act. 52 STAT. 1051 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 352(f) (1946).
16. Wrigley's Stores v. Michigan Board of Pharmacy, 336 Mlich. 583, 59 N.W.2d 8
(1953). The court defined patent and proprietary as "pre-packaged, non-prescription, mass
produced remedies put up for sale to the general public in the distinctive and original con-
tainer, and under the trade name of the manufacturer... .' Id. at 592, 59 N.W2d at 12.
17. Since so-called "ethical proprietaries" are advertised only to the profession, they
are not exempted by the definitions adopted in Arizona, Louisiana, South Carolina, Wyo-
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twenty-two jurisdictions where neither legislature nor judiciary has defined
"patent and proprietary," the power to delimit the statutory exemption rests
in the state Board of Pharmacy.18 At least one board has adopted the technical
interpretation,'" while nine have accepted the common usage.2" In the re-
maining jurisdictions, the boards' attitudes remain unclear.2 1
Recently, economic forces have kindled litigation concerning the meaning
of the "patent and proprietary" exemption. Supermarkets are expanding their
drug departments, 22 and manufacturers of proprietaries hope to increase their
sales by establishing new retail outlets.23 Four times within the last two years
the markets and the manufacturers have asked the judiciary to overthrow a
board of pharmacy's technical definition in favor of the common usage inter-
pretation. 24 Two courts have done so. 2 5 The pharmaceutical profession has
viewed these two decisions with alarm, 26 especially because the profession has
ming, New Jersey, and Michigan, which require sale to the general public. See note 14 supra.
Because demand for unadvertised items would be small, the non-druggist would probably
not wish to stock the "ethicals." Drug products are generally costly and slow moving.
Digges, Retail Price Maintenance in DRUG RESEARCH AND DEVELoP.MIENT 563 (Smith &
Herrick ed. 1948).
18. These jurisdictions are: Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of
Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Maiie, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, North
Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Wash-
ington, and West Virginia. The Board of Pharmacy is granted broad administrative powers,
including power to adopt necessary rules and regulations and to prosecute violators. See,
e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 336 (Supp. 1952) ; GA. CoDE ANN. §§ 84-1309 (Supp. 1951),
84-1311 (1937) ; 2 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 4464 (1949).
19. This is the Board of the District of Columbia. See note 21 infra.
20. Colorado, Florida, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, North Carolina, Oklahoma,
Texas, and West Virginia. See note 21 inlra.
21. A questionnaire was sent to the boards of pharmacy in the twenty-two states listed
in note 18 supra. No reply was received from eight, and the replies of Delaware, Missis-
sippi, Missouri, and Pennsylvania were ambiguous. One clearly indicated adoption of the
technical view. See note 19 supra. And eight indicated use of the common usage inter-
pretation. See note 20 supra. Replies to questionnaire in Yale Law Library.
22. Typical supermarkets now carry from 120 to 400 items in their health and beauty
aids department. Communication to the YALE LAW JOURNAL from National Ass'n of Food
Chains, dated October 16, 1953, in Yale Law Library.
23. Communication to the YALE LAW JOURNAL from Carl Willingham, Secretary-
Treasurer of the National Ass'n of Chain Drug Stores, dated October 2, 1953, in Yale Law
Library. At present there are 54,000 retail drug stores, which the druggist contends are
sufficient to supply the consumer market. Ibid.
24. Wrigley's Stores v. Michigan Board of Pharmacy, 336 Mich. 583, 59 N.W.2d 8
(1953) ; Culver v. Nelson, -Minn.-, 54 N.W.2d 7 (1952); Proprietary Ass'n v. Board
of Pharmacy, 27 N.J. Super. 204, 99 A.2d 52 (1953) ; State v. Wakeen, 263 Wis. 401, 57
N.W.2d 364 (1953).
25. Wrigley's Stores v. Michigan Board of Pharmacy, and Proprietary Ass'n v. Board
of Pharmacy, supra note 24.
26. See Herzog, 'Twixt Supermarket and Courts-Whither Pharnacyr, 14 J. Am.
PHARMACEUTICAL Ass'N 764 (1953).
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lost four percent of the packaged medicine trade since 1950.2 By the same
token, the decisions may well encourage the supermarkets and drug manu-
facturers to press for acceptance of the common usage definition in the eleven
states which still adhere to the technical view or which provide no exception
for patent and proprietary medicines.2 A pitched battle between advocates of
the two interpretations seens to be under way.
The technical definition is objectionable. The public receives no protection
from an interpretation which grants to the pharmacist the exclusive right to
sell pre-packaged, non-prescription medicines. These items require no com-
pounding. The pharmacist is relieved by statute from liability for injuries
caused by the impurity, misbranding, or negligent compounding of such drugs.
He has no duty to analyze them, learn their ingredients, or warn purchasers of
possible danger in their use. 0 Similarly, he is not required to limit or record
his sales.31 He commits a misdemeanor if he engages in the practice of medi-
cine by recommending drugs to his customers.32 In short, the pharmacist uses
no professional skill and assumes no professional liability in the naked act of
retailing harmless pre-packaged remedies.m Often he does not even make the
27. In 1950, 75 percent of the $920,990,0010 retail sales of packaged medications were
made in drug stores. In 1952 the drug stores' share dropped to 72 percent of S933, 0,000.
These figures include $366,660,000 for packaged mLdicine sold on prescription in 19.0 and
$410,000,000 in 1952. With these amounts deducted, the druggists' share of "Over-the-
counter" (non-prescription) sales of packaged medicine dropled from 59 percent in 1950
to 55 percent in 1952. See What People Spent in 1052 for Prodacts Sold in Drruq Stores,
Drug Topics, August 10, 1953.
28. See notes 6,8. 19 supra.
29. See, e.g., 11 I. ST.T. A-. § 151.22 (1946) (nu liability for quality of drugs
sold in original package) ; W. V .CODE § 2905 (Supp. 1953) (same) ; 3 Wvo. Coi . STAT.
§ 37-1910 (Supp. 1953) (same).
Such a provision nullifies the pharmacist's common law liability. Absent statutory im-
munity. he could be held liable to purchasers on a theory of implied warranty. And third
persons might recover either for negligence in the sale of "inherently dangerous" articles,
or else via strict liability based on the theory that the pure food and drug laws impose on the
pharmacist an absolute duty not to sell bad items. See Prossnr, Toni's 671-2. 676, 693
(1941).
30. See Noel v. People, 187 111. 587, 593, 58 N.E. 616, 619 (1900) ; State v. Donaldson,
41 Minn. 74, 82, 42 N.W. 781, 783 (1889) ; State v. Wod, 51 S.D. 485, 491-2, 215 I.V.
487, 489-90 (1927). Also see West v. Emanuel, 198 Pa. 180, 47 Ad. 965 (1901) (no action
against druggist who, without prior analysis, sold fatally toxic patent medicine).
31. See State v. Childs, 32 Ariz. 222, 234, 257 Pac. 366, 369 (19-27); State v. Wood,
51 S.D. 485, 490, 492, 215 N.W. 487, 489-90 (1927). Wqiile the statutes permit unrestricted
sale of pre-packaged medicines by pharmacists, they often limit the quantity of prescription
drugs which he may sell. See, e.g., 11 MIm-N. ST.T. AN . § 152.11 (1946) (prohibiting re-
fills of barbital prescriptions). And poisun laws typically require the pharmacist to record
his sales of toxic substances. See, e.g., id. § 151.24.
32. See, e.g., id. § 147.10; 1-A OHio GE-. CODE § 1286 (Page, Supp. 1952) ; 3 Wyo.
Cozy'. STAT. §§ 37-2007, 37-2013 (1945).
33. See State v. Donaldson, 41 Minn. 74, 81, 42 N.W. 781, 783 (1889) ("One man can
do it just as well as another, if he can read the label on the pacmge and make change with
the purchaser.").
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sale himself, leaving it to ordinary clerks or placing packaged drugs on self-
service shelves.34 If a specific item is found to be dangerous, the way to protect
the public is to permit sale on prescription only. Barring that, sale in the
pharmacy offers little which sale in the supermarket cannot duplicate.85
To be a valid exercise of the state's police power, a statute regulating the
sale of drugs must bear a reasonable relation to public health."0 The objective
of the pharmacy laws-to safeguard the public from mistakes in the preparation
of medicines and from indiscriminate sale of dangerous drugs 8 -is above re-
proach.3 8 But restricting the retail of pre-packaged medicines to the phar-
macist when he has no duty to guard against error or to limit his sales is an
arbitrary and ineffectual method of achieving the legitimate end.80 For this
reason pharmacy acts have been held to violate due process when they con-
tained no exemption for patent and proprietary medicines. 40 In those cases,
34. See Wrigley's Stores v. Michigan Board of Pharmacy, 336 Mich. 583, 594, 59
N.W.2d 8, 13 (1953). Such methods of retailing may constitute a misdemeanor, if a court
does not consider such sales to be made under "personal supervision of a registered phar-
macist." See, e.g., 11 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 151.15 (1946). Violation or no, the growth of
the self-service drug store indicates the absence of any pharmaceutical function in pack-
aged medicine sales.
35. Cases adopting the technical interpretation have been hard put to demonstrate how
the public will be protected. These courts have suggested that the pharmacist will know
where to procure pure drugs. See State v. Zotalis, 172 Minn. 132, 133, 214 N.W. 766 (1927).
Or that he will know how to preserve them and how to "advise prospective purchasers what
products contain the vitamins they seek. ... Culver v. Nelson, - Minn. -, 54 N.W.2d
7, 14-15 (1952). Or that he will protect the public from improperly compounded remedies.
State v. Combs, 169 Ore. 566, 571-2, 130 P.2d 947, 949 (1942) (Quaere: how?). Or that
he would have a tendency to protect the public by disapproving unsafe directions. In re
Gray, 206 Cal. 497, 502, 274 Pac. 974, 976 (1929). The most recent case, State v. Wakeen,
263 Wis. 401, 57 N.W.2d 364 (1953), offers no reasons at all.
The pharmacist's self-interest as a businessman and his professional code of ethics might
cause him to protect his customers' well being, but he is under no legal obligation to do so,
See State v. Wood, 51 S.D. 485, 490, 215 N.W. 487, 489 (1927).
36. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105, 1.11-112 (1928) (invalidating Pennsylvania
act requiring shares in drug store corporations to be owned by pharmacists) ; Pike v. Porter,
- Mont.-, 253 P.2d 1055, 1056-7 (1952) (invalidating statute prohibiting use of word
"drug" in advertising exempt household drugs) ; E. Fougera & Co. v. New York, 224 N.Y.
269, 277-8, 120 N.E. 642, 643 (1918) (upholding ordinance requiring disclosure to board of
health of ingredients of patent medicines).
37. See Kentucky Board of Pharmacy v. Cassidy, 115 Ky. 690, 705, 74 S.W. 730, 733
(1903) ; State v. Donaldson, 41 Minn. 74, 80, 42 N.W. 781, 782 (1889).
38. See Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105, 112 (1928); State v. Donaldson, 41
Minn. 74, 81, 42 N.W. 781, 783 (1889) ; State v. Wood, 51 S.D. 485, 488-9, 215 N.W. 487,
488 (1927).
39. See text at notes 29-33 supra.
40. Noel v. People, 187 Ill. 587, 58 N.E. 616 (1900) (act exempted only those patent
and proprietary medicines to be selected at the discretion of the board of pharmacy) ; State
v. Wood, 51 S.D. 485, 215 N.W. 487 (1927) (no exemption); State v. Childs, 32 Ariz. 222,
257 Pac. 366 (1927) (no exemption) : cf. State v. Donaldson, 41 Minn. 74, 42 N.W. 781
(1889) (act upheld by construing it to exempt patent and proprietary medicines).
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the statutes were held to deprive the non-pharmacist merchant of his property
right to sell such articles, while producing no corresponding benefit to public
health.41 This reasoning applies with equal force to the technical interpretation
of "patent and proprietary." Such interpretation narrows the exemption to a
small and completely arbitrary group of pre-compounded drugs. 42 Patented or
secretly processed itens are in no way more fit for public consumption than
other non-prescription preparations.43 In fact, they seem less suited for un-
supervised sale than those remedies for which U.S.P.-guided by professional
acceptance and public demand-has established uniform standards of purity."4
Courts should therefore hold that the technical interpretation violates sub-
stantive due process. 45 Precedent for such a decision appears in two cases
where state courts, accepting the technical definition, held pharmacy acts un-
constitutional because they failed to exempt all harmless pre-packaged drugs. 4c
Courts are understandably reluctant to go this far and strike down the entire
statute as unreasonable. But such drastic action is unnecessary. An interpreta-
tion which upholds a statute will be used in preference to one which would
41. Noel v. People, 187 Ill. 587, 594, 58 N.E. 616, 619 (1900) ; State v. W\ood, 51 S.D.
485, 488, 215 N.W. 487, 488 (1927) ; State v. Childs, 32 Ariz. 222, 226, 257 Pac. 366, 367
(1927); cf. State v. Donaldson, 41 Minn. 74, 83, 42 N.W. 781, 783 (189).
42. See note 13 supra.
43. Obviously a patent or secret recipe has nu relation to the safety of a medicine. The
technical definition produces the anomalous result that only the newer, little demanded, and
therefore relatively unreliable packaged medicines are exempted. See People v. Herun, 34
Cal. App. 2d 755, 765-6, 90 P.2d 154. 159 (1939) (concurring opinion); Brief for Respon-
dents, pp. 16, 103, State v. Wakeen, 263 Wis. 401, 57 N.W.2d 364 (1953). There it was
shown that aspirin is restricted to the pharmacy but that if caffein is added to aspirin by a
secret process it becomes a proprietary medicine which is freely salable even though more
toxic.
44. See notes 10, 11 supra.
45. The United States Supreme Court has never been asked to pass on the interpretation
of the patent and proprietary exemption. If it should grant certiorari, it is doubtful that the
near-defunct doctrine of substantive due process would be revived. In this event, an equal
protection argument could be made. See State v. Wood, 51 S.D. 485, 215 N.W. 487 (19.7).
In another context the Supreme Court has rejected the technical definition of "proprie-
tary." Ferguson v. Arthur, 117 U.S. 482 (1886) (customs case). But the Court is reluctant
to interfere with state health regulations of this type. See, e.g., Roschen v. Ward, 279 U.S.
337 (1929). That case upheld a state statute prohibiting the sale of eyeglasses without an
optometrist on the premises, but not requiring him to make an examination. Mr. Justice
Holmes stated: "There can be no doubt that the presence and superintendence of a special-
ist tend to diminish an evil." Id. at 339.
Regardless of the Supreme Court's attitude, state courts could be asked to hold the
technical interpretation to be a violation of due process. But for discussion of state courts'
misuse of the substantive due process doctrine, see Paulsen, The Pcristeince of Substantive
Due Process in the States, 34 MixN. L. REv. 91 (1950) ; Note, 53 COL. L RE%- 827 (1953).
46. State v. Stephens, 102 Mont. 414, 59 P.2d 54 (1936) (act unconstitutional in re-
stricting sale of original package medicines); State v. Geest, 118 Neb. 562, 225 N.V. 769
(1929) (act unconstitutional in restricting sale of harmless U.S.P. and N.F. items).
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render it unconstitutional. 47 Courts should leave the pharmacy acts intact, but
satisfy constitutional requirements by adopting the common usage definition
of "patent and proprietary." 48
Apart from constitutional issues, allowing non-pharmacist sale of all pre-
packaged, non-prescription drugs is a sound policy.40 These preparations still
would be subject to laws which prohibit adulteration GO and misbranding,5 1
47. United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 407 (1909). This rule of
construction has been employed to read the patent and proprietary exemption into a phar-
macy act. State v. Donaldson, 41 Minn. 74, 83, 42 N.W. 781, 783-4 (1889).
48. The two most recent cases adopting the common usage definition carefully avoid
constitutional arguments and turn on a fabricated legislative intent, despite the meagerness
of evidence indicating what the legislature in fact intended. In Wrigley's Stores v. Michi-
gan Board of Pharmacy, 336 Mich. 583, 59 N.W.2d 8 (1953), the court did not mention
any constitutional cases even though they were cited in Wrigley's brief and strongly sup-
port the court's decision. In Proprietary Ass'n v. Board of Pharmacy, 27 N.J. Super. 204,
99 A.2d 52 (1953), the court cited such cases with approval but only hinted at the colt-
stitutional issue in holding the Board's all-encompassing definition of "drugs" to bear "no
reasonable relation to the public health, safety and welfare." Id. at 218, 99 A.2d at 60. In
its final judgment, issued two months after the reported opinion, this hint was diluted to
a statement that the Board's definition was not reasonable. Final Judgment, Proprietary
Ass'n v. Board of Pharmacy, Docket No. L-7734-50 P.W., N.J. Super Ct., September 21,
1953, in Yale Law Library. Both Wrigley's Stores and Proprietary Ass'n would be
stronger if they articulated the underlying premise, namely, that the alternative (technical)
interpretation is unconstitutional.
49. The technical interpretation has proved unworkable; the vagueness of the standard
of secrecy makes enforcement problematical. See Brief for Appellees, pp. 22-5, Wrigley's
Stores v. Michigan Board of Pharmacy, 336 Mich. 583, 59 N.W.2d 8 (1953). There the Di-
rector of Enforcement of the Board of Pharmacy was unable to testify whether or not "Ex-
Lax" was patented or produced secretly. The common usage interpretation would provide
the non-druggist merchant and the Board with a test of what remedies were exempt; It
would except any drug which is completely compounded and is not restricted to prescription
sale by federal law or food and drug ,regulations. See Non-Drug Stores Win, Business Week,
May 20, 1939, p. 42.
50. Section 351 of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act defines adulterated drugs
as those containing filthy or poisonous substances, those packed under unsanitary conditions,
those sold in poisonous containers, articles falling below standards set for them by official
compendia, and other articles falling below the strength, purity, or quality stated on the label.
52 STAT. 1049 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 351 (1946). Adulterated drugs may be seized and their
manufacturer subjected to injunctive restraint and criminal liability. 52 STAT. 1043 (1938),
21 U.S.C. §332-4 (1946), as amended, 62 STAT. 582 (1948), 21 U.S.C. §334(a) (Supp,
1952).
51. Section 352 of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act deems misbranded a
drug whose label does not contain conspicuously: (1) the name and address of the manu-
facturer; (2) a statement of active ingredients; (3) the name and quantity of any habit-
forming substances and a warning of their habit-forming nature; (4) a statement of the
quantity of alcohol and certain other dangerous substances; (5) adequate directions
for use and warnings against use in conditions where it may be dangerous; and (6) pre-
cautions against deterioration. A drug is also misbranded when it is dangerous when used
according to directions. 52 STAT. 1050 (1938), as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 352 (1946). Mis-
branded drugs are subject to the same sanctions as adulterated drugs. See note 50 supra.
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prevent false advertising of curative powers,52 and require that the safety of
new drugs be proved before they enter commerce.5 3 Moreover, an increase in
the number of retail outlets will serve consumers' convenience, and it may ex-
pand manufacturers' markets. The only one possibly hurt by adoption of the
common usage definition is the drug store owner, who may loEe much of the
trade which traditionally has been his.-- But he should nut be heard to com-
plain. While holding his drug patronage captive, he has been free to expand
his merchandising in all directions. Today almost half his sales are unrelated
to drugs-55 And he will retain his prescription filling business. Certainly his
plight does not seem tragic enough to justify sheltering him from competition
through use of the technical definition-a legislated monopoly masquerading
as a health regulation.
52. The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act deems misbranded any drug bearing
a false or misleading label. 52 STAT. 1050 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 352(a) (l946). The Federal
Trade Commission Act prohibits the disseminativn of any false or misleading advertising
(other than on labels) likely to induce the purchase of drugs. 52 ST,%T. 114 (193S), 15
U.S.C. §§ 52-5 (1946).
53. The New Drugs section of the Federal Fvd, Drug and Cismetic Act requires that
an application be filed containing the rtsults of investigations of the safety of the preduct,
a statement of its composition ard meth, d of manufacture, specimens of the proffered label,
and samples of the drug itself. 52 ST.T. 1052 (1938), 21 U.S.C. §355 (1946). This Secti, ,n
was drafted as a result of the 73 deaths caused in 1Q37 by Elixir Sulfanilamide, which had
been tested only for flavor before being marketed. SE:€. Dc. No. 124, 75th Cong., 2d Sess.
1 (1937).
On a non-legal level the American Medical Association Council on Pharmacy and
Chemistry also scrutinizes and approves new drugs under even stricter standards. See
Smith, Professional Acceptance in DRUG RErEARcH AND DE rL0P NET 53-43 (Smith &
Herrick ed. 1948).
54. Most consumers would probably find it more convenient to purcha-se drug preducts
in the supermarkets. In addition, the drug store would probably lose sales because the
public associates the drug store with retail price maintenance and higher prices. See
Herzog, supra note 26, at 770. This would seem to be true in spite of the fact that super-
markets could not sell items undtr fair trade contract below the established price.
55. In 1952, 53 percent of drug store sales were of health, toilet, and beauty items.
The remainder is attributable to household supplies (e.g., polishes), stationery, magazines,
and newspapers, photographic equipment, sundries (clocks, light bulbs, etc.), tobacco, Cun-
fections, soda fountain, alcoholic beverages, and "unclassified" items. This last category
includes an ever-expanding variety of merchandise, such as electrical appliances, jewelry,
cutlery, vacuum bottles, and musical supplies. The total amount tof such sales increased
from $9,390,000 in 1950 to $61,690,000 in 1952. See What People Spent in 1052 for Products
Sold in. Drug Stores, Drug Topics, August 10, 1953.
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